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PENNSYLVANIA’S SALES AND USE TAX:
HAS NEARLY $1 BILLION BEEN “ZAPPED” AWAY IN FRAUD ?
Richard Thompson Ainsworth
The Sales and Use Tax is an essential part of Pennsylvania’s revenue profile. Not only is
it the State’s second largest revenue source,1 it has historically played a critical role in reducing
the volatility of Pennsylvania’s overall tax collections.2 The sales tax is also critical to the city of
Philadelphia,3 and Allegheny County.4 During the current economic downturn both the revenue
and structural attributes of this levy should be pushing it to the front of the tax policy line.
In short, the observation is – if revenue is going to be hard to come by for a period of
time, then at least it needs to be dependable. In Pennsylvania, dependable revenue means sales
and use tax revenue. It would also be helpful if revenue could be found that did not involve a
rate increase or a tax base expansion.
As a result, the two topics that should rest atop Pennsylvania’s tax policy agenda should
be: (1) joining the Streamlined Sales Tax initiative5 and (2) stemming revenue losses from
automated sales suppression software (Zappers). The first initiative would yield additional
revenue of $220 – $384 million (from e-commerce alone);6 the second effort (based on the
author’s estimates) would yield additional $922 million in revenue (in the restaurant industry
alone). One of the more attractive aspects of both of these efforts is that neither involves
changing rates. Both provide additional revenue primarily by improving enforcement.

1

Federation of Tax Administrators, 2007 State Tax Collection by Source (indicating that 28.1% of all Pennsylvania
revenue is generated by the sales tax whereas 31.8% is generated by the personal income tax) available at:
http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/07taxdis.html (last visited, August 26, 2010).
2
John L. Mikesell, Dynamic Patterns in State Sales Tax Structures: Tax Policy Change and Convergence, 19792007, 51 STATE TAX NOTES 175, 187 (Jan. 19, 2009) (indicating that without the sales tax the volatility of the
Pennsylvania tax system increases by more than 50% to 8.23% from 5.64% over the period from 1979 through
2000, also indicating that the full Pennsylvania system is less volatile than the mean generally, but more volatile
than the mean if all states are considered without the sales tax).
3
Philadelphia Office of the City Controller, Financial Forecast & Snapshot, (January 2010) (indicating that a
dramatic increase in sales tax revenues - $18.2 million or nearly 60% reflects an increase in the sales tax rate to 2%,
but masks a 8% decline in the City’s tax base from the prior year) available at:
http://www.philadelphiacontroller.org/publications/fpau/Combined%20Snapshot%20and%20Forecast_2010_01.pdf
(last visited, August 26, 2010).
4
2009 County of Allegheny Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (December 31, 2009) 127 & 316 (indicating
that sales tax revenues were $39,172,875, which represented a decrease of 2.9% or $1.2 million) available at:
http://www.alleghenycounty.us/controll/cafr2009.pdf (last visited, August 26, 2010).
5
The Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement (SSUTA) is a tax harmonization and voluntary software
certification regime. Under the SSUTA tax calculation software is certified by Member States. Businesses that use
certified software (or that contract with trusted third-party providers that uses certified software) are insulated from
liability for any errors in determining the proper tax. See: SSUTA § 301 (voluntary registration); § 402A (amnesty
rules); § 501 (certification provisions). The SSUTA is available at: http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org.
6
Donald Bruce, William F. Fox & LeAnn Luna, State and Local Sales Tax Revenue Losses from E-Commerce, 52
STATE TAX NOTES 537, 544 (May 18, 2009) (estimates for years 2007 – 2012, aggregating to $1,711.9 million in
Pennsylvania for all six years).
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For the moment at least, Pennsylvania has decided not to join the twenty-three other
states that are part of the national effort to streamline sales and use tax compliance through the
harmonization of common tax rules and procedures8 – the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax
Agreement (SSUTA).9
7

Joining SSUTA would require changes in the tax base. It is understandable that there
could be difficult political questions here. However this does not mean that Pennsylvania should
ignore Zappers and the serious revenue threat that automated sales suppression technology poses
to state and local revenues. Zappers are cash skimming software applications. When they are
added to modern electronic cash registers (ECRs) they create serious enforcement problems.
Quebec is the sub-national jurisdiction closest to Pennsylvania that has an aggressive
anti-Zapper enforcement effort. The Quebec program is returning sizable amounts of revenue to
the government. There is a lot to be learned from this Canadian province. The Quebec Sales
Tax (QST) is a value added tax (VAT) like the Canadian federal goods and services tax (GST).
For sales to final consumers (which is where Zappers are installed) there is no difference
between the retail sales tax that Pennsylvania has adopted and the Canadian GST, or the Quebec
QST.
This paper is about the threat that Zappers pose to the strength and stability of the sales
and use tax, and how Pennsylvania can move against them by borrowing from experiences in
other jurisdictions – some international, some domestic. Importantly, one of the places that
Pennsylvania can look is to the certification provisions of the SSUTA. It is not necessary to join
SSUTA to learn from it – although joining it might not be such a bad idea eventually.
Pennsylvania and SSUTA. Before moving on to Zappers a word on SSUTA is necessary.
There are arguments on both sides of the debate on whether or not to join SSUTA. It seems that
the larger states (California, New York, Illinois and Texas for example) have not found them
persuasive.
The financial argument for joining SSUTA comes from Section 401(B). It allows remote
vendors (without nexus in a market state) to collect and remit tax on sales sourced to the state.10
The business incentive for doing so involves assurances that compliance cost will be minimal,
and an amnesty is available (just in case the vendor should have been collecting taxes all along).

7

Although the agreement itself was the product of the combined effort of 44 states and the District of Columbia, the
23 full-member states that are currently implementing the SST are: Aransas, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island,
South Dakota, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming. Ohio, Tennessee, and Utah are
associate members.
8
Douglas Rooks, Maine Tax Panel Rejects Compliance with Streamlining Agreement, TAX ANALYSTS (Doc 20066877; 2006 STT 69-9) (Apr. 11, 2006).
9
Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement (adopted November 12, 2002, amended November 19, 2003 and further
amended November 16, 2004).
10
Andrew W. Swain & Helder A. Pinto, State Interest Grows in Tapping Out-of-State Sellers for Revenue, 53 STATE
TAX NOTES 505, 513 2009 STT 161-1 (Aug. 24, 2009) (comparing the efforts under the SSUTA with revisions of
nexus rules as a way to secure e-commerce revenue).
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The ease of compliance that encourages businesses to collect taxes is a result of the uniformity
that the state laws have under the SSUTA.
One of the major reasons that states do not join SSUTA is this same uniformity. Some
argue that SSUTA’s “one size fits all” solution does not always “fit” local circumstances.11
Additionally, states that join SSUTA loose sovereignty on critical issues like the definition of the
tax base.12
For example, at last count there were in excess of 258 provisions in Pennsylvania Statute
that would need to change to bring the state into conformity with SSUTA. Some changes are as
minor, such as, replacing “retail price” with “sales price,”13 others are potentially more
significant. Conforming the definition of “candy and gum” to the SSUTA’s definition of
“candy,” or “food and beverages” to SSUTA’s “prepared food,” and “grocery type items” to
SSUTA’s “food and food ingredients,”14 would have a broad impact on a large number of
Pennsylvania businesses.
If Pennsylvania is not anxious to engage in the political debate necessary to make
SSUTA-mandated changes, then perhaps it could make a concerted effort against Zappers. This
might be the preferred way to go, if the state is in need of additional revenue.
SKIMMING WITH ZAPPERS AND PHANTOM-WARE
Skimming cash receipts is an old-fashioned tax fraud; a fraud traditionally associated
with small or medium sized enterprises. Large businesses with formalized internal control
mechanisms, external accountants, and professional management structures do not normally
engage in skimming,15 although personal conversations with auditors from Revenue Quebec
indicate that this may not be a solid assumption any more.
Businesses that skim frequently keep two sets of books (one for the tax man, the other for
the owner). In its simplest (non-technological) form there are two tills, and the cashier simply
diverts some cash from selected sales into a secret drawer. A record of the diversion may be
maintained, but it will be kept outside the formal accounting system. Businesses that skim rarely
do so with credit card transactions precisely because these sales can be documented externally
through the banking system. Skimming frauds thrive when the owner (or a close family
member) is the cashier.16
11

Robert D. Plattner, Daniel Smirlock & Mary Ellen Ladouceur, A New Way Forward for Remote Vendor Sales Tax
Collection, 55 SATE TAX NOTES 187, 191; 2010 STT 11-2 (Jan. 18, 2010) (explaining the New York position on the
SSUTA and indicating why it is not likely that it will join). See also: Thomas M. Leonard & Stephen McGonegal,
The Streamlined Sales Tax Project … An Initiative Whose Time Has Not Come, THE MILKEN INSTITUTE REVIEW 18
(June 2005).
12
Id., at 191.
13
61 Pa Code §31.14(a).
14
61 Pa Code §60.7(a).
15
EU Commission, Fiscalis Committee Project Group 12, Cash Register Project Group, Cash Register Good
Practice Guide, ¶ 2.5 (Dec. 2006) (on file with author).
16
See for example the use of double tills to manually skim cash receipts in the UK at Aleef Garage Ltd. This was a
£5.3 million tax fraud, and according to Steve Armitt, Group Leader HMRC Criminal Investigations indicated, “…
the investigation was made all the more difficult because of the closed ranks of the employees involved some of
whom were close family members … [t]hose involved tried to make it as difficult as possible for the cheating to be
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Technology is changing how businesses skim. The agents of change are software
applications – phantom-ware and zappers. Phantom-ware is a “hidden,” pre-installed
programming option(s) embedded within the operating system of a modern electronic cash
register (ECR). It can be used to create a virtual second till and may preserve a digital (off-line)
record of the skimming (a second set of digital books). The physical diversion of funds into a
second drawer is no longer required, and the need for manual recordkeeping of the skim is
eliminated. Because phantom-ware programming is part of the operating system of an ECR its
use can be detected with the assistance of a computer audit specialist.
Zappers are more advanced technology than phantom-ware. Zappers are special
programming options added to ECRs or point of sale (POS) networks. They are carried on
memory sticks, removable CDs or can be accessed through an internet link. Because zappers are
not integrated into operating systems their use is more difficult to detect. Zappers liberate
owners from the need to personally operate the cash register. Remote skimming of cash
transactions is now possible without the knowing participation of the cashier who physically
rings up the sale. This attribute of Zappers allows the incidence of skimming fraud to migrate
beyond the traditional “mom and pop” stores. Zappers allow owners to place employees at the
cash register, check their performance (monitor employee theft), but then remotely skim sales to
cheat the taxman.
While Pennsylvania has uncovered no zappers or phantom-ware applications, the
Province of Quebec (alone) has brought over 250 cases to court.17 In the early days Quebec was
concerned that the software that facilitated this fraud was US made and was sold over the
internet for $500.18 Canadian subsidiaries of US companies were early providers.19 Soon
however, the design and installation of this software became a “cottage industry” for local IT
professionals.
discovered.” HMRC News Release, Company Directors Jailed for £5million Fraud 1 (Nov. 13, 2007) available at
https://www.gnn.gov.uk/content/detail.asp?NewsAreaID=2&ReleaseID=330199 (last visited August 25, 2010).
17
Roy Furchgott, With Software, Till Tampering Is Hard To Find, NYT C6 (August 20, 2008) indicating:
[T]he Canadian province of Quebec may be the world leader in prosecuting zapper cases. Since
1997, zappers have figured in more than 230 investigations, according to the tax collecting body
Revenue Québec, which has found an active market for the software. In making 713 searches of
merchants, Revenue Québec found 31 zapper programs that worked on 13 cash register systems.
Available at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/30/technology/30zapper.html?scp=1&sq=With%20Software,%20Till%20Tamperi
ng%20Is%20Hard%20to%20Find%20%20comments&st=cse
18
Craig Silverman, Zapped!, HOUR (Feb. 19, 2004) available at:
http://www.hour.ca/news/brief.aspx?iIDArticle=783 (last visited August 25, 2010).
19
Turcotte v Quebec (Ministry of Revenue) 1998 CarswellQue 1041, [1998] R.D.F.Q. 110 Superior Court of
Quebec. This case involved the MRQ investigation of Gamma Terminal, Inc., a wholly owned Canadian subsidiary
of an American company, Gamma Micro Systems. This investigation began in 1997 and focused on the distribution
of the Gamma Restaurant Management System. It eventually lead to a number of conviction of restaurants that used
this system to delete sales records, including the companies 136530 Canada, Inc. and San Antonio’s Grill. Revenue
Quebec, Press Release, Deux sociétés coupables d'avoir utilisé un camoufleur de ventes dans des restaurants de
Laval et de Repentigny (English Trans. Two companies guilty of having used a camoufleur sales in restaurants in
Laval and Repentigny) April 25, 2005 available at
http://www.revenu.gouv.qc.ca/eng/ministere/centre_information/communiques/ev-fisc/2005/25avril.asp (in French,
translation on file with author) last visited August 25, 2010.
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To get a sense of how Zappers and phantom-ware function in the marketplace, and how it
becomes a “cottage industry” for the installers of electronic cash registers (ECRs) and point of
sale (POS) systems, a brief review of the two US cases and three Quebec cases is helpful.
American Zapper cases. There are only two reported US Zapper cases – Stew Leonard’s
Dairy and the La Shish restaurants. Both follow federal income tax investigations.20 Detailed
information about the LaShish restaurants case is not publicly available. It remains an open and
active criminal case involving international fugitives closely associated with a known terrorist
organization. There is a great deal known about Stew Leonard’s Dairy.
Stew Leonard’s Dairy. Stew Leonard’s Dairy was “the largest criminal tax case in the
history of Connecticut.”21 It was also the “largest computer driven tax-evasion case in the
nation.”22 Stew Leonard’s Dairy (a local grocery chain associated at one time with a dairy farm)
skimmed an estimated $17 million in receipts over a ten-year period. The cash was taken in
large denomination bills by suitcase to St. Martin in the Caribbean.23
The Connecticut Supreme Court describes the Zapper used in Stew Leonard’s Dairy as
follows:
The Dairy’s sales recording system was composed of a computerized cash
register system [with 25 ECRs] that recorded sales at the time of the transaction.
At the point of sale, each product, which contained a universal product code
(UPC) indicating its taxable or non taxable status, was scanned and the resulting
sales information was transmitted to the main computer terminal. The Equity
program [the in-house name for the Zapper], among other things, altered some of
the UPC-based computerized records of the Dairy’s gross sales. Specifically the
program reduced item and dollar sales across a broad range of products to
20

In the Stew Leonard’s Dairy case U.S. Customs searched Stew Leonard Sr. in the Spring of 1991, leading to the
execution of search warrants on August 9, 1991 by special agents of the IRS Criminal Investigation Division.
Leonard, 37 F.3d at 35; 75 YEARS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION HISTORY, supra note 21, at 145. The State of
Connecticut commenced its audit “… as a result of IRS actions, in February, 1992 …” Leonard, 254 Conn. 286, 289
(2003). On July 22, 1993 Stew Leonard pleaded guilty in the federal audit. The State’s audit was no where near
completion at this time. A final Connecticut determination was not rendered until February 27, 1996.
The La Shish case seems to follow a similar pattern, although this cannot be stated with certainty. The only
public information on the La Shish case is through court documents filed in the federal enforcement action. Nothing
is public from the State of Michigan, although it would seem clear that along with the skimmed gross receipts would
be skimmed sales tax. There is no record of a prior State of Michigan tax, or related search and seizure action. In a
request for this information Mike Eschelbach, Administrative Law Specialist, Tax Policy Division replied:
Michigan law (Michigan Compiled Laws Section 205.28(1)(f)) prohibits divulging any facts or
information obtained in connection with the administration of a tax, or information or parameters
that would enable a person to ascertain the audit selection or processing criteria of the department
for a tax administered by the department. According, we are unable to provide you with the
information you seek.
Personal e-mail communication, Feb. 4, 2008 (on file with author).
21
DEPT. OF THE TREAS., I. R. S. 75 YEARS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION HISTORY (1919 – 1994) 146, available at
http://www.thememoryhole.org/irs/irs_75_years.rtf (last visited Sept. 15, 2010).
22
Jacques Steinberg, Connecticut Store Owner Sentenced in Tax Fraud, NYT, Sec. B, page 1, col. 3 (Oct. 21, 1993)
23
U.S. v. Stewart J. Leonard Sr. & Frank H. Guthman, 37 F.3d 32 (1994), aff’d. 67 F.3d 460 (2nd Cir. 1995)
(although the tax case was settled, the details of the fraud are preserved in these federal sentencing appeals).
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correspond with the amount of cash diverted each week. As we noted previously,
the Equity program did this by writing over the original sales data, thereby
rendering the original data irretrievable.
In our view, the result was akin to destroying the electronic equivalent of
cash register tapes and replacing those tapes with ones containing false sales
data.24
Stew Leonard’s Dairy is a microcosm of how the manual skimming of cash receipts
moves into technology. There are two pressures on an enterprise like Stew Leonard’s Dairy (a)
an increased risk of detection from increasingly sophisticated auditors, and (b) the sheer
complexity of skimming small amounts of cash from a large number of small transactions in an
extremely diverse retail operation.
Skimming began at Stew Leonard’s in the 1970’s as a physical skimming operation. It
was performed by the CFO, Barry Belardinelli who worked in the store’s vault room where large
bags of cash were received daily from the store’s cash registers.25
Belardinelli coordinated the skimming (but the amounts and days of the week when
skimming was performed was designated by Frank or Steven Guthman). In about 1981 or 1982
this skimming was automated. The Second Circuit indicated:
To conceal the skim, defendants instituted a computer program that altered
the stores sales data to account for the skimmed cash. Creation of the program
was necessary to synchronize the data generated by the computerized cash
registers with the information generated by Belardinelli’s altered daily sales
reports. In 1981or 1982, Frank Guthman instructed Jeffrey Pirhalla, a store
computer programmer, to write a complex program [called the “Equity Program”]
that reduced the store’s sales and financial data by the amount of the skimmed
cash and permanently altered the data from which the books and records were
created. The program left no audit trail that it had run. Frank Guthman operated
it on the first day of each accounting week using the figures provided him by
Belardinelli and kept the tape cassette containing the program hidden in his office.
He instructed Pirhalla to keep the program secret and, from time to time, told
Pirhalla to alter the program to keep up with the store’s changing computers.26
Mr. Pirhalla was a computer specialist with detailed knowledge of the operating system
of the ECRs used in Stew Leonard’s Dairy. Stew Leonard hired Pirhalla from National Cash
Register (NCR). It was important to employ someone like Mr. Pirhalla, because a Zapper need
to be re-designed whenever the base operating system is updated. Running an old Zapper against
the records of an updated ECR often leaves traces that a good auditors can use to detect the
fraud.
Mr. Pirhalla however, was a risk that could not be minimized. Once fraud was suspected,
“[t]he IRS and U.S. Attorney [became] very interested in Mr. Pirhalla’s first-hand knowledge,
24

Leonard, 264 Conn., at 298.
Leonard, 37 F.3d at 33.
26
Id. at 35.
25
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and immediately enlisted his cooperation in return for granting him immunity from prosecution.
… The IRS [also] retained the services of NCR personnel who were expert in the Dairy’s
computer system. They, along with Mr. Pirhalla, worked under the supervision of special agent
Doreen Schultz, the IRS’s own computer book-keeping system expert.”27
One of the special features of the Zapper in Stew Leonard’s Dairy was that it was
designed to do more than “zap” cash sales. It was also designed to withstand the scrutiny of a
rigorous income tax audit – an audit that undertook to systematically match purchases
(inventory) against sales. The Equity Program adjusted both prices and units bought and sold.
Minor price changes were evenly spread out and inventory losses recorded as increases in
spoilage. The design was to make the skimming nearly undetectable on normal audit. The
Connecticut Superior Court makes this clear:
As an example, the program was designed to say that today’s criteria for
the sale of cucumbers would be 50 units. If more than 50 units of cucumbers
were sold, the excess was diverted into the Equity Program. The Equity Program
scanner went through every single item that was sold that day. The amount
diverted was spread over a wide spectrum of products. Some calculations
amounted to pennies per item.28
The Zapper in Stew Leonard’s Dairy pre-dated memory sticks, CDs and zip files.
This Zapper was kept on a cassette in a hollowed out book in Stew Leonard’s library.
Obsolete versions of the program were kept by Frank Guthman at home in his
basement.29
La Shish restaurants. More recently, Talal Chahine and his wife, Elfat El Aouar, owners
of the thirteen-store La Shish restaurant chain in Detroit, Michigan acquired the dubious
distinction of replacing Stew Leonard’s Dairy as the leading U.S. Zapper case. Although Elfat
was sentenced, May 16, 2007, to 18 months for tax evasions, Talal remains a fugitive from U.S.
authorities (believed to be in Lebanon) with a warrant issued for his arrest.30 Together they
zapped more than $20 million in cash sales over a four-year period and sent the funds in small
denomination cashiers checks to Hezbollah in Lebanon.31
Quebec Zapper cases. There are over 250 zapper cases in Quebec, but three of them can
be used to more fully illustrate how Zappers are spread through a marketplace by small IT
professionals that install and maintain ECRs and POS systems – the cases of Audio Lab LP,
Michael Roy and Luc Primeau are considered.

27

Brief for Appellee, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 17-18.
Stewart J. Leonard Sr. dba Stew Leonard’s Dairy v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, No. CV 980492503S,
2000 Conn. Super. LEXIS 991, at 4-5 (Conn. Sup. Ct. Jun. 10, 2003) (emphasis added).
29
U.S. v. Stewart J. Leonard Sr. & Frank H. Guthman, 37 F.3d 32, 35 (1994), aff’d. 67 F.3d 460 (2nd Cir. 1995).
30
Press Release, U.S. Dept of JU.S.tice, Eastern District of Michigan, LaShish Financial Manager Sentenced for 18
months for Tax Evasion (May 15, 2007) available at:
http://www.cybersafe.gov/tax/U.S.aopress/2007/txdv072007_5_15_ElAouar.pdf (last visited Sept. 15, 2010).
31
Press Release, U.S. Dept of JU.S.tice, Eastern District of Michigan, Superseding Indictment returned Against
LaShish Owner (May 30, 2007) available at:
http://www.jU.S.tice.gov/tax/U.S.aopress/2007/txdv072007_5_30_chahine.pdf (last visited Sept. 15, 2010).
28
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Audio Lab LP. On April 8, 2004 Revenue Quebec announced that it executed four search
warrants on the numbered company 9061-1184 Quebec Inc. that operated a restaurant under the
name San Antonio Grill in Laval, Quebec. The allegation was that a “sales Zapper” (camoufleur
de ventes) was used delete sales records. The Zapper was on a diskette used in connection with
the restaurant’s computer system.32
Next year, on April 25, 2005, Revenue Quebec announced that the director of San
Antonio Grill pleaded guilty to using a Zapper. (The director, Mr. Apostolos Mandaltsis, was
personally fined.) A related company of similar name, Grill San Antonio in Repentigny, also
pleaded guilty to similar offences.33
Later that year, on October 1, 2005, Revenue Quebec announced that it executed five
more search warrants in Montreal and Laval with respect to Audio Lab LP, Inc. It was under
suspicion of having developed and marketed a Zapper that was compatible with its own
restaurant cash register software, Softdine.34
Softdine was the operating software in the cash registers at San Antonio’s Grill in Laval,
and at Grill San Antonio in Repentigny. On June 26, 2007 Audio Lab LP, Inc. pleaded guilty to
charges of having, “… designed and marketed a computer program designed to alter, amend,
delete, cancel or otherwise alter accounting data in sales records kept by means of a software that
[Audio Lab LP] had designed and marketed.” In other words, it pleaded guilty to developing a
Zapper to “add-on” to its own commercial software (Softdine) that it provided to restaurants for
use in their POS systems. Press reports directly link this conviction to the investigation begun at
Grill San Antonio in Laval in 2004.35
Michael Roy. Before the first warrants were issued in Audio Lab LP Revenue Quebec
had successfully brought to conclusion an extensive investigation of twenty-eight restaurants
doing business under the name Stratos. Each of the restaurants in the Stratos chain used Zappers.
To dispose of the excess cash from skimmed sales (1) a double billing system was put in place
32

Revenue Quebec, News Release, Le ministère du Revenu soupçonne le restaurant Grill San Antonio de Laval
d'avoir utilisé un zapper (Eng. Trans.Tax Evasion: The Ministry of Revenue Suspects the Restaurant Grill San
Antonio de Laval of having used a Zapper) (Apr. 8, 2004) available at:
http://www.revenu.gouv.qc.ca/eng/ministere/centre_information/communiques/ev-fisc/2004/08avril.asp (in French
only, (last visited Sept. 15, 2010).
33
Revenue Quebec, News Release, Deux sociétés coupables d'avoir utilisé un camoufleur de ventes dans des
restaurants de Laval et de Repentigny (Eng. Trans. Two Companies Guilty of having used Zappers in Restaurants in
Laval and Repentigny), available at:
http://www.revenu.gouv.qc.ca/eng/ministere/centre_information/communiques/ev-fisc/2005/25avril.asp (in French
only, last visited Sept. 15, 2010).
34
Revenue Quebec, News Release, Revenu Québec enquête sur un concepteur de logiciel de point de vente
soupçonné d'avoir conçu et distribué un camoufleur de ventes (Eng. Trans. Revenue Quebec Investigation of a
Software Designer Outlet Suspected of having Developed and Distributed Zappers (Oct. 14, 2005) available at:
http://www.revenu.gouv.qc.ca/eng/ministere/centre_information/communiques/ev-fisc/2005/14oct(2).asp (in French
only, last visited Sept. 15, 2010).
35
Revenue Quebec, News Release, La société Audio L.P. inc. condamnée pour fraude fiscale (Eng. Trans. The
Company Audio LP, Inc. Convicted of Tax Evasion) (Sept. 21, 2007) available at:
http://www.revenu.gouv.qc.ca/eng/ministere/centre_information/communiques/ev-fisc/2007/21sep.asp (in French
only, last visited Sept. 15, 2010).
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with suppliers (to conceal purchases made in cash), and (2) wages were paid to employees in
cash (without being reported as income).
The guilty pleas from this investigation came in waves – nineteen companies pleading
guilty on September 26, 2002; another six pleading guilty on October 11, 2002, and the four
remaining pleading guilty on March 21, 2003. Press releases provide details of only the final ten
companies. In aggregate the taxes and penalties for these companies came to $1,816,070.90, but
the real thrust of the news releases were that “… the Department has conducted searches in order
to establish proof that the designer of the IT function associated with the cash register software
Terminal Resto had participated in the scheme set up by restaurants in the Stratos chain.” The
breakdown is: $429,179.07 (GST) + $492,023.11 (PST) + $214,589.55 (federal penalties) +
$625,028.89 (provincial penalties) + $55,250.28 (judicial fees).36
That proof was forthcoming on April 25, 2003, when Mr. Michel Roy and his two sons
Danny and Miguel were convicted of tax evasion. The father (Michel) was the creator of the
Zapper that worked with Resto Terminal. He promoted it and made the sales. His sons (Miguel
and Danny) installed the software and designed the civil fraud. Aggregate fraud penalties
assessed against the Roys were $1,064,459.37
Luc Primeau. Revenue Quebec announced on March 17, 2003 that seven Patio Vidal
restaurant franchises and a bar, La Tasca, from Gatineau, Quebec as well as another bar named
O’Max in Masson-Angers, Quebec were convicted of adding Zappers to their Microflash cash
register software (later upgraded to a new version called Caracara). Even though guilty pleas
were entered on March 14, 2003, a search warrant had already been executed the previous
December against the designer of Microflash and Caracara, because the software developer was
suspected of also being the developer of the associated Zapper program.38
On October 17, 2005 Luc Primeau admitted using his software to assist these companies
to evade $435,000 in GST and QST. They skimming $2.7 million is cash sales. Mr. Primeau
was fined $20,000 for his involvement. However, Mr. Primeau was more than a Zapper
salesman, he considered himself a provider of management services (admittedly focused on how
to “manage Zappers”) for which he also charged a fee. Revenue Quebec determined that not
only did Mr. Primeau fail to report GST and QST of $33,725.45 on his own sales (of Zappers),
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Revenue Quebec, News Release, Tous les restaurants Stratos coupables de fraude fiscale en lien avec l'utilisation
du zapper (Eng. Trans. All Stratos Restaurants Convicted of Fraud in Connection with the use of a Zapper (Mar. 18,
2003) available at: http://www.revenu.gouv.qc.ca/eng/ministere/centre_information/communiques/evfisc/2003/18mars.asp (in French only, last visited Sept. 15, 2010).
37
Revenue Quebec, News Release, Des amendes de plus de un million de dollars - Un père et ses deux fils
condamnés pour fraude fiscale en lien avec le zapper (Eng. Trans. Fines of more than One million dollars – A
Father and his Two Sons convicted for Tax Evasion in connection with the Zapper (May 2, 2003) available at:
http://www.revenu.gouv.qc.ca/eng/ministere/centre_information/communiques/ev-fisc/2003/02mai.asp (in French
only, last visited August 25, 2010).
38
Revenue Quebec, News Release, M. Marcel St-Louis de l'Outaouais coupable de fraude fiscale liée à l'utilisation
d'un zapper (Eng. Trans. Mr. Marcel St. Louis de l’Outaouais Convicted of Tax Evasion related to the use of a
Zapper) (Mar. 17, 2003) available at:
http://www.revenu.gouv.qc.ca/eng/ministere/centre_information/communiques/ev-fisc/2003/17mars.asp (in French
only, last visited August 25, 2010).
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but he also failed to report income of $155,084.99 in services income Zapper management
advice).39
The real reason Mr. Primeau did not report this income is probably [although no one
really knows] has to do with the fact that he was being paid out of the $2.7 million in skimmed
cash sales from the nine companies where he sold, installed and managed his Zappers. These
funds probably needed to be kept “hidden” (to facilitate the overall success of the fraud), and in a
sense represented his “share” of the skimmed profits.
SCOPE OF THE ZAPPER PROBLEM - STUDIES
The leading government studies of automated sales suppression are from Quebec and
Germany. The UK has completed a national study but it is not public. Sweden has also
completed a non-publicly available study, and all we know is that the results indicate that 70% of
the ECRs in Sweden are infected.40 The available studies (Quebec and German) focus on the
restaurant sector.
The German and Quebec studies both underscored the need for significant enforcement
efforts. Neither government has made the full studies available (because some details contain
confidential taxpayer information), but a government-to-government exchange could be (and
most likely should be) arranged, if Pennsylvania wanted more detail. Summaries have been
released, and they arrive at similar conclusions.
Quebec. The government of Quebec conducted two studies. The first study gathered its
subjects from the customer list of a known distributor/developer of automated sales suppression
software. This investigation (the First Inspection Wave) examined 70 systems and uncovered 41
zappers.41 A more statistically accurate investigation followed (the Second Inspection Wave). It
was based on a random sample of businesses within the restaurant and hospitality industry. This
survey, conducted by Finances Quebec, found that 16% of all sales went unreported.42 This of
course is a consumption tax as well as an income tax problem.
Both of these studies were relied upon by the Quebec Minister of Revenue, Jean-Marc
Fournier, when he announced legislative changes, enhanced enforcement efforts, and a pilot
project designed to counter the penetration of sales suppression technology in the restaurant
sector. On January 28, 2008 he indicated:
39

Revenue Quebec, News Release, Le concepteur d'un camoufleur de ventes de Boucherville plaide coupable à
diverses accusations portées par le fisc québécois (Eng. Trans. The Zapper Designer of Boucherville Pleads Guilty
to Various Charges brought by Inland Revenue Quebec (Oct. 26, 2005) available at:
http://www.revenu.gouv.qc.ca/eng/ministere/centre_information/communiques/ev-fisc/2005/26oct.asp (in French
only, last visited August 25, 2010).
40
Bo Arvidsson, Tax Director, Head Office, Swedish Tax Agency, personal e-mail communication, February 18,
2010:
The study was made of a random sample from different manufactures of cash registers sold in
Sweden. That 70 % of all registers could be used for manipulation is not the same as 70 % in
reality were used to suppress earnings. (emphasis in original)
41
Dave Bergeron & Richard Ainsworth, Zappers (Automated Sales Suppression) 12, powerpoint presentation at the
New York Prosecutors Training Institute (Syracuse, NY) July 31, 2008 (on file with author).
42
Id. at 13 (but noting further that the 16% figure measures all skimming frauds, not just skimming with Zappers).
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Although the majority of restaurant owners comply with their tax obligations, the
restaurant sector remains an area of the Quebec economy where tax evasion is
rampant, both in terms of income taxes and sales taxes. Tax losses in this sector
are significant. Revenue Quebec estimates them at $425 million for the 20072008 fiscal year.43
Other things being equal,44 because Pennsylvania’s economy is roughly 217% the size of
the Quebec economy, a similar study in Pennsylvania’s restaurant sector might find tax losses in
the range of $900 million to $1 billion.45 Although restaurants are a popular area for sales
suppression it is clear from Dutch and Brazilian investigations that grocery and convenience
stores, hairdressers and butcher shops also have very high concentrations of automated sales
suppression. Because the sales tax does not reach as broadly as a GST/VAT, this kind of
technology-assisted fraud in Pennsylvania’s grocery stores and hairdressing salons would impact
the income tax more than the sales tax.
Germany. The Interim Report of the German Working Group on Cash Registers
indicated that the Group was “… aware of [technology-assisted] fraud amounting to 50% of
companies cash receipts.”46 The Working Group did not separately quantify the kinds of
technology-assisted fraud involved.
The Working Group’s 50% observation is supported by a report made by the German
Federal Audit Office (BHR) to the German Parliament in 2003. In this report the BHR appears
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Revenue Quebec, Press Release, Jean-Marc Fornier, Pour plus d'équité dans la restauration : il faut que ça se
passe au-dessus de la table; (English trans. For more equity in the restaurant sector it is required that [business is
conducted] above the table ) available at :
http://www.revenu.gouv.qc.ca/eng/ministere/centre_information/communiques/autres/2008/28jan.asp (last visited
Mar. 20, 2009). See also the accompanying powerpoint presentation, Facturation obligatoire dans le secteur de la
restauration, L’évasion fiscale au Québec, Sous-déclaration des revenus dans le secteur de la restauration;
(English Trans. Tax Evasion in Quebec : Obligatory Billing in the Restaurant Sector – Under-declaration of
revenues in the restaurant sector) 3 (January 28, 2008) (in French) (on file with author, with translation).
44
Of course “other things” are not equal. Take for example the relative tax rate structures of Quebec and
Pennsylvania. Because zappers reduce reported taxable income of businesses, and because these businesses tend to
use these funds either to pay undeclared dividends or employee wages under the table, there is more than just a
consumption tax problem here so the tax rate comparison needs to be broad. In some taxes, the Pennsylvania rates
are lower, but in others they are higher than those in Quebec.
Consumption Tax: Pennsylvania’s sales tax rate is 6% (although in Philadelphia an extra 2% is added and in
Allegheny County an extra 1% is added) whereas Quebec’s is 7.5% throughout the province.
Corporate Income Tax: Quebec taxes corporate business at 11.9%, but there is a reduced rate for small businesses
of 8%. The corporate income tax rate in Pennsylvania is 9.99%.
Personal Income Tax: Quebec taxes personal income between 16 and 24% (indexed with an inflation factor of
2.36%). Personal income tax rate in Pennsylvania is 3.07%.
45
Quebec’s GDP was $166.9 million (expressed in 1999 dollars); Pennsylvania’s GDP was $362.7 (expressed in
1999 dollars). Thus, 362.7/166.9 = 217%; 217% x 425 million = $922 million. Demographia, Regional Gross
Domestic Product (GDP): Ranked North America, Europe, Japan & Oceania (Purchasing Power Parity) (GDP
figures based on US Department of Commerce, European Union, OECD, Statistics Canada, Australian Bureau of
Statistics, New Zealand Bureau of Statistics, Japan Statistical Bureau) available at:
http://www.demographia.com/db-intlppp-region.htm
46
Working Group on Cash Registers: Interim Report 5 (Mar. 16, 2005) (Ger.) (translation on file with author).
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to focus only on factory installed software.47 The BHR concludes that the potential loss in
Germany is in the billions of euro:
The Federal Audit Office (BHR) has complained that later models of electronic
cash registers and cash management systems now fail to meet the principles of
correct accounting practice when it comes to recording transactions … The risk of
tax fraud running into many billions [of euro] should not be underestimated in
cash transactions.48
Both the BHR’s observations and the Working Group’s study are further buttressed by
summaries from studies conducted by three German federal states. These studies are limited.
Like the Quebec studies, they focus only on the restaurant sector. But, they too conclude that
sales suppression is a significant problem:
One federal state is currently implementing a special “restaurant” initiative.
Checks already made have led to average upward revisions of 46% of original
turnover. A comparable initiative in another federal state resulted in over half the
cases (54%) having upward revisions of 60% of declared turnover. Fraud
amounting to 25% was detected in a fifth of the cases, and was as high as 5% in
the remaining 26% of cases. A third federal state has found that around 45% of
till receipts involving cash are subject to upward revisions ranging from 20% to
118%.49
Therefore, based on these studies and the American cases, it seems reasonable to
conclude that zappers may well be siphoning off more than $900 million in sales tax revenue
from Pennsylvania’s restaurant sector each year (and have been doing so for about ten years,
given the start of the Quebec enforcement activities and the scope of the problem at that time).
SOLUTIONS – POLICY ORIENTATIONS
Globally, two policy orientations guide enforcement actions in this area – one approach is
rules-based; the other is principles-based.50 They are not mutually exclusive – degrees of
blending are common. Rules-based jurisdictions adopt comprehensive and mandatory legislation
regulating, and/ or certifying cash registers. Jurisdictions taking this approach include Greece
and (possibly) Germany. These jurisdictions are classified generally as “fiscal till” or “fiscal
memory” jurisdictions.
Principles-based jurisdictions rely on compliant taxpayers following the rules.
Compliance is enforced with an enhanced audit regime. Comprehensive, multi-tax audits (the
simultaneous examination of income, consumption and employment returns) are performed by
teams that include computer audit specialists. Audits are frequently unannounced and preceded
by undercover investigations that collect data to be verified. Jurisdictions taking this approach
include the UK and the Netherlands. France has implemented a program of preventive audits
47

Id. at 5 (listing the following attributes: (1) erasing all data entries, (2) resetting the zero counter, (3) unwarranted
counter-entries, (4) unwarranted use of the training mode, and (5) suppressing the grand total memory).
48
BRH comments 2003, No 54, Federal Parliament circular 15/2020 at 197-198 (Nov. 24, 2003) (in German)
(original and translation on file with author).
49
Id. at 5.
50
Fiscalis Committee Project Group 12, Cash Register Project Group, Cash Register Good Practice Guide, 5-6
(Dec. 2006) (unpublished report on file with author).
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that target technology providers.51 A similar effort can be found in Quebec where the customer
lists of audited technology providers have been used to roadmap later audits of businesses
suspected of technology-assisted skimming.
Quebec is in transition between these policy orientations. Prior to January 28, 2008
Quebec was squarely with the group that preferred a principles-based approach. However, the
Quebec Minister of Revenue, Jean-Marc Fournier, announced52 that by late 2009 the MRQ
(Ministry of Revenue, Quebec) would be testing the module d’enregistrement des vents
(MEV).53 The MEV is currently used only in the restaurant sector. By 2011 MEVs will be
mandatory in all Quebec restaurants, where they will assure accuracy and retention of business
records within electronic cash registers (ECRs).
The US is particularly hampered in its approach to Zappers – federal income tax audits
are not well coordinated with state and local retail sales tax audits. In addition, federal computer
audit specialists are not normally assigned to audits of small and medium sized enterprises
(SMEs), and this is where the Zappers are.
Nevertheless, if Pennsylvania wants to tackle this problem it could apply a uniquely
American solution - blending rules and principles based solutions in a simple extension of
SSUTA principles.54 Under a SSUTA structure certified third party software providers (CSPs)55
could be tasked with assuring ECR accuracy. Not only is the SSUTA legal framework
operational, but at present levels of technology a CSP could readily assure a state like
Pennsylvania that the ECRs were accurately recording sales, that the correct retail sales tax was
being collected by the business, and that it was properly remitted. At the same time federal
authorities could be assured that Zappers were not being used to underreport income.
Certification of the CSP could be undertaken jointly (by state and federal agencies).
But there is even more that can be done. Puerto Rico has been invited to join the SSUTA
and has not done so (like Pennsylvania), but it is contemplating a comprehensive sales tax
compliance systems that will involve (a) direct remission of tax collected on credit card
transactions to the tax administration, (b) Zapper preventions software installed on all ECRs, and
(3) certified tax calculation and return submission by third party providers.
51

Id. at 6.
Revenue Quebec, Press Release, Jean-Marc Fornier, Pour plus d'équité dans la restauration : il faut que ça se
passe au-dessus de la table (For more equity in the restaurant sector it is required that [business is conducted] above
the table) (Jan. 28, 2008) available at :
http://www.revenu.gouv.qc.ca/eng/ministere/centre_information/communiques/autres/2008/28jan.asp (last visited
Mar. 18, 2009, translation on file with author).
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Jean-Marc Fornier, L’évasion fiscale au Québec : Facturation obligatoire dans le secteur de la restauration –
Sous-déclaration des revenus dans le secteur de la restauration (Tax Evasion in Quebec : Obligatory Billing in the
Restaurant Sector – Under-declaration of revenues in the restaurant sector) 3 (January 28, 2008) (in French)
(powerpoint presentation and translation on file with author).
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Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement (adopted November 12, 2002, amended November 19, 2003 and
further amended November 16, 2004) § 203 (defining a CSP as “[a]n agent certified under the Agreement to
perform all the seller’s sales and use tax functions, other than the seller’s obligation to remit tax on its own
purchases.”) available at http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org.
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Id., at § 203 (defining a CSP as “[a]n agent certified under the Agreement to perform all the seller’s sales and use
tax functions, other than the seller’s obligation to remit tax on its own purchases.”)
52
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SOLUTIONS – PRESENT APPLICATIONS
The final part of this article will describe four solutions to the zapper problem. The
traditional fiscal till solution (employed by Greece) will be contrasted with the traditional
principles-based solution (employed by the Netherlands). The Germany smart card approach
will be considered next, followed by the Puerto Rican comprehensive hybrid approach.
GREECE:
NATIONALLY CERTIFIED ECRs
Greece has had comprehensive, rules-based fiscal till legislation in place for over twenty
years. Technical specifications for Fiscal Electronic Devices (FEDs) were published widely in
2004. These rules provide complete ECR data security.
All Greek ECRs are certified. It is illegal to operate a business with a non-certified cash
register. All technical specifications for certification are set out in Greek law. It is a very simple
matter for an auditor to determine if a specific ECR has been tampered with. Factory-installed
phantom-ware must be removed before certification. If a self-help version of phantom-ware56 is
put on an ECR it will either be blocked or, or there will be a record of the manipulation so that its
impact on revenues will be neutralized. Data from all transactions are preserved and SHA-1
encrypted in the fiscal memory. Use of an add-on zapper is a violation of the licensing
regulations, and is detected in the same manner as self-help phantom-ware.
Through the certification process the Ministry of Finance preserves a copy of all
approved firmware. It is a simple matter to calculate a checksum value (CRC-3257 or SHA-1)
for the object code of the firmware. Auditors can then read the contents of the program memory
of a certified ECR and determine if changes have been made in the firmware (through phantomware or zappers) by comparing his reading with that of the file kept in the Ministry of Finance.
If Pennsylvania were to adopt the Greek approach it would most likely do so through a
business license rule. One of the conditions for doing business in Pennsylvania (if the business
was planning on making sales to the public) would be the purchase, installation and use of a
certified cash register. A more stringent rule would make it illegal to sell unregistered cash
registers in the state.
THE NETHERLANDS:
COMPREHENSIVE TRADITIONAL AUDITS

56

For a discussion of self-help phantom-ware see: Richard T. Ainsworth, Zappers and Phantomware: The Need for
Fraud Prevention Technology, 50 TNI 1017 (June 23, 2008) available at:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1139826.
57
CRC-32, or cycle redundancy check, takes as input a data stream of any length, and produces as output a value of
a certain space, commonly a 32-bit integer. The term CRC is often used to denote either the function or the
function's output. A CRC can be used as a checksum to detect alteration of data during transmission or storage.
CRCs are popular because they are simple to implement in binary hardware, are easy to analyze mathematically, and
are particularly good at detecting common errors caused by noise in transmission channels. The CRC was invented
by W. Wesley Peterson. W. Wesley Peterson & D. T. Brown, Cyclic Codes for Error Detection, 49 PROCEEDINGS
INST. RADIO ENGINEERS 228 (Jan. 1961).
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The Netherlands is a principles-based jurisdiction, relying only on traditional audits to
detect sales suppression technology. Fiscal till jurisdictions, like Greece, also rely on audits, but
not to the same extent and certainly not with the comprehensive scope as the Dutch.
The Dutch are convinced that audits (alone) are sufficient. They reject fiscal till
technology. The fundamental emphasis in the Netherlands is on detailed, comprehensive, and
technologically penetrating audits. Direct government intrusion into the recordkeeping systems
of all businesses (encrypting the memory of all ECRs and POS systems) just to catch a few
fraudsters is avoided. The Netherlands feels it can rely on good business practices and compliant
taxpayers.
Netherlands officials speak about performing “deep audits.” A “deep audit” considers
businesses comprehensively – it looks at income taxes, consumption taxes and employment taxes
simultaneously and with heavy stress on the interrelationships among taxes.
The Netherlands has been successful with this approach. One of the best examples of
how a comprehensive multi-tax audit can uncover data manipulations, and how this fraud is
derivative of the symbiotic relationship that develops between SMEs and their ECR providers
can be seen in the Grand Café Dudok case.58
Dudok skimmed cash receipts with a primitive zapper and used a portion of the cash to
pay employees under the table. The Belastingdienst (Dutch IRS) was suspicious of the low
wages reported, and thought that additional (unreported) compensation might be being
distributed (under the table).59 Testimony in the case indicated that on the second day of the
payroll audit the managing director of Straight Systems BV visited Dudok. Straight Systems
BV60 supplied the Finishing Touch point-of-sale cash registers that were used by Dudok. The
owner-manager explained that he was having difficulty accounting to the Belastingdienst for
wages, in part because the auditors were also questioning the turnover. The numbers did not
“seem right” to the auditors, and they were requesting back-up data, something that would lead
them to the primitive zapper he was using.
The managing director of Straight Systems explained the existence of a more
sophisticated zapper, a “hidden delete” option already embedded in the Finishing Touch cash
registers. This was, “… a hidden menu option that, after enabling …, allowed operators of
58

District Court of Rotterdam, LJN: AX6802 (Jun 2, 2006) available at:
http://zoeken.rechtspraak.nl/resultpage.aspx?snelzoeken=true&searchtype=ljn&ljn=AX6802 (in Dutch) (translation
on file with author); appealed to the District Court of The Hague where the judgment is upheld LJN: BC5500 (Feb.
29, 2008) available at: http://zoeken.rechtspraak.nl (in Dutch) (translation on file with author).
59
LJN: BC5500, at F3. Prior to using the phantom-ware installed on its system Dudok was skimming sales in a very
amateur fashion. The entire sales records of the POS system were deleted and records were reconstructed on x-cell
spreadsheets. The examining agents did not trust the spreadsheets and asked for the POS records as a back-up to
confirm what they were being shown on the audit. This in turn lead to the conversation with Straight Systems BV
where Dudok was informed that they already had phantom-ware that might solve this problem installed in their
system. Ben B.G.A.M. van der Zwet, (personal e-mail correspondence May 28, 2008) (on file with author).
60
Straight Systems BV is a Netherlands company that specializes in single-service ECR systems where all hardware
and software are developed “in house.” The company web site offers a 24-hour help desk where there is “… one
point of contact for all hardware and software for checkout’s front office and back office systems.” Available a t:
http://www.straight.nl (in Dutch, translation on file with author) (last visited August 25, 2010).
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catering establishments to delete cash register receipts from the system.”61 After this discussion
“… an employee of [Straight Systems] visited [Dudok] and explained [and enabled] the
application of the erase rule [or hidden delete function62], after which [Dudok] subsequently
decided to start using [it] …”63
The court upheld criminal tax fraud determinations in the Dudok case under income,
value added, and payroll taxes. Both the restaurant operator and the ECR/ software provider
were convicted.
It is clear that an intensive and comprehensive audit approach works against automated
sales suppression devices. If Pennsylvania were to take this approach it would (most likely) need
to invest heavily in technology proficient tax auditors. This is a labor-intensive approach to
Zappers, and the state would need to make this commitment.
GERMANY
EMBEDDING SMART CARDS IN ECRs
The German solution involves encrypting critical data from the ECR on smart cards
securely embedded in ECRs. The German National Metrology Institute (PTB: PhysikalischTechnische Bundesanstalt) is the home of the INSIKA project (Integrierte Sicherheitslösung für
Kassensysteme – Integrated Security Solutions for Cash Registers), which began work on
prototypes of the solution in 2008.
Papers on encryption64 by Dr. Norbert Zisky of the PTB convinced the German Working
Group that encryption techniques had been sufficiently tested in secure communication settings
with measuring instruments65 that they could form the basis of a solution to zappers. The
INSIKA project was charged with completing the technical specifications for a signature smart
card by the summer of 2008,66 but work was not fully complete until the middle of 2009.
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LJN: AX6802, at Consideration of the Evidence (Jun 2, 2006) (in Dutch) (translation on file with author). The
case discusses three software programs: Twenty/Twenty; Finishing Touch; Tickview.exe. Twenty/Twenty was a US
touch-screen program that did not have a phantom-ware application. Straight Systems BV added the phantom-ware
application to Twenty/Twenty and renamed the program Finishing Touch. Using just this program you can view the
sales ticket and change data. With a secret command the Tickview.exe program within Finishing Touch can be
activated and the operator is asked if they would like to delete the whole ticket. If an affirmative response is given
then the system records a “no sale” and the entire audit trail to the original data is eliminated. Ben B.G.A.M. van
der Zwet, (personal e-mail correspondence May 28, 2008) (on file with author).
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The trial court in Rotterdam refers to the phantom-ware application as a “hidden delete function” whereas the
appeals court in The Hague refers to the phantom-ware as “the erase rule.”
63
LJN: BC5500, at F3.
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Norbert Zisky, Manipulation Protection – Electronic Cash Registers and POS Systems, German Federal
Standards Laboratory, Brunswick & Berlin (May 2005) (unpublished draft on file with author); Norbert Zisky,
Manipulationsschutz elektronischer Registrierkassen und Kassensysteme German Federal Standards Laboratory,
Brunswick & Berlin (Mar. 15, 2004) (Ger.) (unpublished draft on file with author).
65
Luigi Lo Iacono, Christoph Rulans & Norbert Zisky, Secure Transfer of Measurement Data in Open Systems, 28
COMP. STANDARDS & INTERFACES 311 (Jan. 2006); SELMA Project http://www.selma-projekt.de (in German) (last
visited August 25, 2010).
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The INSIKA project finished its work on schedule, although the time line for publication of the results has been
pushed back. The results were demonstrated at a February 18, 2009 conference in Berlin.
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Included with the technical specifications for the signature smart card was a determination of the
data structures and formats, communication protocols and security analysis for the system.67
Based on the recommendations of the Working Group, Vectron Systems AG developed
(and is currently demonstrating) a privately developed prototype of the German solution. Under
the Vectron prototype, every record holding of sales data (or any other activity performed on a
cash register) is secured through an encrypted hash total of the main data elements in the ECR.
A secure electronic signature is issued for this data based on Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).
The essence of the German solution revolves around cryptography and smart card access
to cryptographic data preserved within the cash register or POS system. When the revenue
authority audits it can access the records of the cash register with a “key” to read the data and
determine if there has been tampering.
The German solution is a fiscal till solution, but it is far more flexible and potentially
more comprehensive than the Greek solution. The German solution was to have all ECRs and
POS systems fitted with a smart card containing a crypto processor that e-signs designated “taxrelevant data.” With this device the entire Electronic Journal could be signed on a regular basis,
or each transaction open or closed (sale, refund, training session, voided sale, or temporary
record) could be designated as a tax relevant and signed whenever entered into the ECR. It
would not matter under the German system if a receipt issues (Greek and Quebec solutions are
dependent on “legal receipts.”) It would only matter that each sale be processed through an ECR
or POS system, and for that system to be fitted with a smart card.
The government could conduct audits remotely, because the German solution is fully
digital. A data feed could be taken directly from ECRs, or data could be transmitted through an
e-mail attachment. The Greek solutions cannot do this, but the Puerto Rican and Belgian
solutions do.
The Greek and German solutions can also be distinguished based on “per unit” cost of
implementation. The German solution is far and away the least expensive. Greece has concerns
over the high costs of its solution. Under the Greek regime the entire cost is born by business,
although the government does provide tax breaks (accelerated depreciation) and financial
assistance (low interest loans) to assist with hardware purchases. Quebec on the other hand plans
to provide their solution to businesses for free, but the overall cost to the government is expected
to be $55 million.68
Dr. Zisky estimates a cost of 50 euro for the German smart card solution.69 In fact,
Vectron’s prototype of the INSIKA smart card solution has an even lower cost estimate of a
“single-unit end-user price of less than 25 euro.”70
67

Ben B.G.A.M. van der Zwet, Note: Draft 20080201 – Fiscal Obligations for Cash Registers in the Netherlands 10
(Feb. 1, 2008) (unpublished draft on file with author).
68
Caroline Rodgers, Québec va de l’avant pour stopper la fraude fiscale, HOTELS, RESTAURANTS & INSTITUTIONS
(Feb. 12, 2008) available at : http://www.hrimag.com/spip.php?article2771 (in French only, translations with
author).
69
Personal e-mail communication, Professor Zisky (February 19, 2008) (on file with author).
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In spite of all this work the German solution has not been implemented. Political will
seems to be lacking, or revenue needs are not sufficiently acute. If Pennsylvania wanted to adopt
the German smart card (instead of the Greek ECR certification) approach the cost per ECR
would be small, and the implementation would most likely be through the same business license
rules suggested under the Greek section above.
PUERTO RICO – BLENDING RULES & PRINCIPLES:
CERTIFICATION OF THIRD PARTY SERVICE PROVIDERS
If Pennsylvania suspects that Zappers are a problem,71 the immediate next step is to
measure the extent of the problem. It needs an initial probe and a follow-up study. If this study
returns results like Quebec’s and Germany’s, then one would expect to find that nearly 50% of
all Pennsylvania’s ECRs are infected with Zappers or phantom-ware (although the Swedish
results were 70%). Estimated (aggregate) revenue losses should be in the neighborhood of 16%
of total revenue (sales tax, business income tax, payroll taxes and personal income taxes
combined).
Pennsylvania might also consider a visit to Belgium to discuss Belgian approaches to this
problem. Belgium is assessing the latest European technological solutions. As of this writing
(August 2010) Belgium is reviewing Swedish, and German approaches as well as some of the
best private-sector solutions.
Belgium has reviewed the Swedish Board for Accreditation and Conformity Assessment
(SWEDAC) certification standards that were completed in late 2009. It also completed an
assessment of the smart-card solution developed by the INSIKA project of the German PTB.
The PTB published technical specifications to its signature smart card in late 2009.72 Data
structures, formats, communications protocols and security analysis are all freely available.
Pennsylvania should also take note of the way Belgium encouraged tailor-made thirdparty solutions to meet its needs. For example, when BMC Inc. appeared before the Belgian
revenue authority it responded to the Belgian request for an even better and more cost effective
ECR security module by sending its eTax device into further development. BMC’s eTax was
already one of the few devices that met SWEDAC standards. It was certified by the Swedish tax
administration on August 24, 2009.
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Vectron, A.G., Tamper-proof POS Data for Projectgroep Onderzoek Administratieve Software (Oct. 31 2007),
available at http://www.gbned.nl/downloads/xmllogistiek/poas/20071031%20Vectron.pdf (last visited Mar. 23,
2009).; Norbert Zisky, Manipulation Protection – Electronic Cash Registers and POS Systems, German Federal
Standards Laboratory, Brunswick & Berlin (May 2005) (unpublished draft on file with author) at ¶ 5.7 (estimating
50 euros); Norbert Zisky, Manipulationsschutz elektronischer Registrierkassen und Kassensysteme German Federal
Standards Laboratory, Brunswick & Berlin (Mar. 15, 2004) (Ger.) (unpublished draft on file with author).
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were surprised when 17 out of 19 sales proposals included Zappers. That state is now conducting further studies
and more carefule technology audits.
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Netherlands 10 (Feb. 1, 2008) (unpublished draft on file with author).
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When BMC made its presentations on March 4 and 5, 2010 it demonstrated a greatly
enhanced eTax device – the Sales Data Controller (SDC). The SDC incorporates the INSIKA
smart card into its protection profile. This new system meets German and Swedish demands for
security. But BMC did not stop there. It went further. The new BMC system borrowed from
the Quebec solution an ability to produce encrypted bar codes on receipts that can be read by a
hand-held audit scanner.
The Belgian effort then, is a classic example of how a tax administration can use the
marketplace to forge strategic partnerships that advance cutting-edge solutions. By controlling
the specifications and insisting on free competition, Belgium feels confident that it will find a
balanced (cost-effective/cutting-edge/optimally secure) solution. Pennsylvania could do the
same. Belgium is casting the net broadly, considering a wide range of government and privatesector solutions. As technology advances, so too will the specifications and the certification
standards.
Belgium, at this point, is looking around for feasible technical solutions at
reasonable cost for both taxpayer and government and [which will offer] the
highest possible protection. … The Belgian Government will make a choice and
then publish the required technical specifications … Whatever that choice will be
[, the field for providing cash register security] will be open for competition, in
accordance with all EU rules of free competition.73
What else can be done? Perhaps the agreement reached between the major credit card
companies and the government of Puerto Rico whereby tax collected on credit card sales is
remitted directly to the tax authority should be considered?74 Businesses prefer a direct
remission system because it removes the sales tax from credit card fees. Under the current
system when a credit card company remits the tax back to the retailer it assesses credit
transaction fees on the tax amount as well and the purchase price, before the tax is forwarded to
the state. This system will directly reduce business costs. In Pennsylvania this would reduce
credit card fees by 6% to 8%.
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Personal email communication of 25 February 2010 with Jan C.A. de Loddere, Belgian Ministry of Finance (on
file with author).
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Standard & Poors, GLOBAL RATINGS PORTAL, RATINGS DIRECT, Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corp.; Sales
Tax 6 (May 18, 2009) available at: http://www.gdb-pur.net/investors_resources/documents/COFINA05x2009SP.pdf
Collection and payment procedures
Sales tax revenues are collected on a monthly basis by First Data Corp., a provider of electronic
commerce and payment solutions for businesses and consumers; Banco Popular de Puerto Rico; or
any other authorized collector designated by the Secretary of the Treasury. Merchants have until
the 10th of every month to remit sales tax collections for the prior month. Collectors transfer sales
tax revenues on a daily basis to a bridge account at Banco Popular in the name of the Treasury
Department, as paying/receiving agent. Once the funds are deposited in the Banco Popular bridge
account, Banco Popular then transfers on a daily basis (with a two-day delay) to the trustee
collections from the entire 5.5% sales and use tax until the base amount has been deposited in the
DSTF, and thereafter to the Treasury Department all subsequent sales tax collections until the
department has received its share (2.75%/5.5%) of the collections received to date in the fiscal
year ...
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There are three aspects to accurate sales tax collection and enforcement: (1) credit card
sales, (2) cash sales, and (3) Zappers. If credit card sales are directly remitted, and cash sales are
securely recorded (and digitally reported to the government through an eTax device similar to
that on the SDC) and if these attributes are blended with the certified service provider concept
under the SSUTA, then a fully digital, accurate, and fiscally secure sales tax system can be put in
place. Returns would be fully automated, revenues would be remitted close to real time, and
audit burdens would be substantially reduced.
The author proposed this solution in Montreal at a conference sponsored by the Quebec
Ministry of Finance.75 This conference, like this symposium issue, was reaching out to tax
academics to try to find solutions to revenue shortfalls.
But then again, Pennsylvania might not believe there is a problem with Zappers and
phantom-ware in the Commonwealth. On May 16, 2008, after a Zapper presentation at the
Federation of Tax Administrators the author directed the following question to Ms. Janis
Holloway, a spokesperson for the Pennsylvania Department of Revenue:
“Have you seen a zapper in Pennsylvania?”
The question was referred, and the Deputy Secretary for Compliance and Collections
responded for the Commonwealth. He indicated:
“We do not have Zappers [in Pennsylvania. However, t]hey are being deployed
in Canada … mostly in the restaurant businesses …”76
If this is indeed the case, and there have been no cases uncovered since 2008 in Pennsylvania to
prove otherwise, then the search for more sales tax revenue needs to be directed at rate increases
or the SSUTA.

75

Richard T. Ainsworth, US Enforcement and Research in Consumption Tax Fraud (June 3, 2010) powerpoint
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